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Abstract
The utilization of spatial context to improve accuracy in
most fast object detection algorithms is well known. The de-
tectors increase inference speed by doing a single forward
pass per image which means they implicitly use contextual
reasoning for their predictions. We show that an adversary
can exploit such contextual reasoning to fool standard de-
tectors. We develop adversarial patches that make an ob-
ject detector blind to a particular category even though the
patch does not overlap with the missed detections. We also
study methods to fix this vulnerability and show that limit-
ing the use of contextual reasoning during object detector
training acts as a form of defense that makes the detector
robust. We believe defending against context based adver-
sarial attack algorithms is not easy. We take a step towards
that direction and urge the research community to give at-
tention to this vulnerability.
1. Introduction
The computer vision community has studied the role of spa-
tial context in object detection for a long time. It is well-
known that object detection performance is improved by
considering information from the entire scene. Fast object
detectors (YOLO [22], SSD [15], and Faster-RCNN [23])
process the entire image in one forward pass to reduce in-
ference time and hence implicitly use contextual informa-
tion for their predictions. Note that some previously used
object detectors (e.g., RCNN [10]) do not use context since
they do a forward pass for each region proposal separately
but they are less accurate and much slower than the fast de-
tectors mentioned above.
In this paper, we study the scenario where an adversary
can exploit the implicit contextual reasoning to fool object
detectors in a practical setting. We design an algorithm to
learn an adversarial patch which if pasted on the corner of
an image and has no overlap with any objects of interest can
make the detector blind to a specific object category chosen
∗Equal contribution
Figure 1: Left- the original image with the correct detection
of “car”. Right- our adversarial patch on the top-left corner
has changed the detection result to “dining table” with a
very high confidence even though the patch does not overlap
with the “car”.
by the adversary. For example, if the category chosen is
“pedestrian” in self-driving car applications, the attack may
have a high impact on personal safety.
Since our adversarial patch does not overlap with the ob-
ject being attacked, we believe the attack works because the
detector considers the influence of not only the object but
also the surrounding objects and the scene. For instance,
in Fig. 1 (left), the detector is using the understanding of
the complete scene for detecting “car”. Hence, our adver-
sarial patch, in Fig. 1 (right), can exploit this reasoning and
change the detection from “car” to “dining table” by fooling
the model to see the scene differently.
We believe this is of paramount importance because:
(1) This poses a question to the research community with
regards to accuracy versus robustness when using detectors
that utilize context. The problem is challenging since there
is no straightforward way of limiting fast state-of-the-art
object detectors to avoid using context even at the cost of
accuracy. As mentioned above, these detectors process the
image only once for fast inference. Also, in deep models,
it is difficult to limit the receptive field of the final layers of
the network so as to not cover the whole image.
(2) Adversarial patch attacks are easily reproducible in a
practical setting as compared to standard adversarial attacks
which add -bounded perturbation to the whole image. One
can simply print an adversarial patch and expose it to a self-
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driving car by pasting it on a wall, on a bumper, or even by
hacking a road-side billboard. In contrast, regular adversar-
ial examples need to perturb all pixel values. Though the
perturbations are small, this is not very practical.
(3) Standard defense algorithms developed for regular ad-
versarial examples[17, 11] are not necessarily suitable
for adversarial patches since the patches are not norm-
constrained, i.e., can have large perturbations in a limited
number of dimensions. Hence, in the space of pixel values,
the adversarial image, i.e., image + patch, can be very far
from the original image. There are two standard defense
frameworks for regular adversarial examples: (a) Training
with adversarial examples: This is not suitable for our case
since learning the patch is expensive. (b) Training with reg-
ularizers in the input space: This is not suitable either since
such defense algorithms assume the noisy image is close to
the original one in the pixel space.
We show that our defense, which limits the use of context
during training the object detector, works the best among all
the defenses we evaluate. We believe that further work is
needed to develop defense algorithms which fix the vulner-
abilities introduced by adversarial patches.
Moreover, we observe that well-known Grad-CAM al-
gorithm [25] is not suitable for localization tasks. We mod-
ify this method to localize the explanation of each detection
and use it to visualize the use of context before and after our
defense algorithm.
Our findings in this paper show that even though we be-
lieve in the richness of context in object detection, employ-
ing contextual reasoning can be a double-edged sword that
can make the object detection algorithms vulnerable to ad-
versarial attacks.
2. Related Work
Vulnerability to Adversarial Attacks: Convolutional neu-
ral networks have been shown to be vulnerable to adversar-
ial examples. Szegedy et al. [30] first discovered the ex-
istence of adversarial images. Gradient based techniques
such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [11] and Pro-
jected Gradient Descent (PGD) [17] were used to create
these adversarial examples. [29] showed that perturbing
just one pixel is sufficient to fool classifiers. [18] presented
an optimal way to create adversarial examples and later ex-
tended that to create an universal adversarial image [19].
However these attacks are not feasible for practical appli-
cations like IOT cameras and autonomous cars since we do
not have access to all pixels and even perturbing single pixel
that fools in multiple conditions becomes challenging. [33]
showed that we can fool classifiers by adding an adversarial
frame around the image that is trained to fool the classi-
fier. Apart from classification, object detection and seman-
tic segmentation networks have also shown to be vulnerable
to adversarial examples. [32, 28] have shown that adversar-
ial examples can be created for object detectors as well. Fis-
cher et al. [8] showed the same for semantic segmentation.
Adversarial patches: Adversarial patches were introduced
in [3, 13] which when pasted on an image can cause a clas-
sifier to output a target class. This poses a question as to
whether object detection also has these vulnerabilities. Hu-
mans are rarely susceptible to mis-classifying objects in a
scene if we introduce artifacts which do not overlap with
the objects of interest. However, we show in this paper that
object detection networks use context in such a way that
they can be fooled easily using this technique. [16] is a
concurrent work that attacks object detection to gather all
RoIs extracted by the detector on the region that the patch
occupies. Our ideas are on a different path since we want
to make the object detector blind and we do not use the
saliency of the patch as an attack. In fact, in our evaluation,
we ignore any false positive detections which appear on the
patch location. Another work with similar motivations was
presented in [28], but the adversarial patches are presented
on top of the object (stop-sign as an example). We consider
a setting where the patch has no overlap with the object and
thus highlight that contextual reasoning can lead to adver-
sarial vulnerability. [21] showed the vulnerability of optical
flow systems to adversarial patches.
Contextual reasoning in object detection: The relation-
ship between objects and scene has been known for a long
time to the computer vision community. Particularly, spa-
tial context has been used in improving object detection. [6]
empirically studies use of context in object detection. [31]
shows that scene classification and object classification can
help each other. [5] utilizes spatial context in a structured
SVM framework to improve object detection by detecting
all objects in the scene jointly. [12] learns to use stuff in
the scene to find objects. [20, 2, 24] discuss the role of
context in object detection while [26] for classification and
segmentation. [35] shows that a network trained for scene
classification has implicitly learned object detection which
suggests the inherent connection between scene classifica-
tion and object detection.
More recently, with the emergence of deep networks, uti-
lizing context has become easier and even unavoidable in
some cases. For instance, Faster-RCNN, SSD, and YOLO
process the input image only once to extract the features and
then detect objects in the feature space. Since the features
are coming from all over the image, the model naturally
uses global features of the scene.
3. Method
Background on YOLO: Given an image x, YOLO divides
the image into a S × S grid where each grid cell predicts
B bounding boxes, so there are BS2 possible bounding
boxes. Assuming C object classes, the model processes
the image once and outputs, P (object) ∈ R: an object-
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ness confidence score for each possible bounding box and
P (category|object) ∈RC : scores of all categories condi-
tioned on existence of an object at every grid cell, and a lo-
calization offset for each bounding box. During inference,
the objectness score and class probabilities are multiplied
to get the final score for each bounding box. During YOLO
training, the objectness score is encouraged to be zero for
background locations and closer to one for ground-truth ob-
ject locations, and the class probabilities are encouraged to
match the ground-truth only at the location of objects.
Adversarial patches: Assume an image x, a recognition
function f(.), e.g., object classification, and a constant bi-
nary mask m that is 1 on the patch location and 0 every-
where else. The mask covers a small region of the image,
e.g., a box in the corner. We want to learn a noise patch z
that when pasted on the image fools the recognition func-
tion. Hence, in learning, we want to optimize:
z∗ = argmin
x
L(f(x (1−m) + z m; t)
where  is the element-wise product, t is the desired ad-
versarial target, and L is a loss function that encourages the
fooling of the model towards predicting the target. Note that
any value in z for which m = 0 will be ignored.
In standard adversarial examples, we learn an additive
perturbation so that when added to the input image, it fools a
recognition function, e.g., object classifier or detector. Such
a perturbation is bounded usually by `∞ norm to be invis-
ible perceptually. However, in adversarial patches z is not
additive and is not bounded. It is only bounded to be in the
range of allowed image pixel values in the mask location.
This difference makes studying adversarial patches inter-
esting since they are more practical (they can be used by
printing and showing to the camera) and also are difficult to
defend due to unconstrained perturbations.
3.1. Our adversarial attacks
Per-image blindness attack: We are interested in studying
if an adversary can exploit contextual reasoning in object
detection. Hence, given an image x and an object category
of interest c, we develop an adversarial patch that fools the
object detector to be blind to category cwhile the patch does
not overlap with instances of c on the image.
Since we are interested in blindness, we should develop
attacks that reduce the number of true positives rather than
increasing false positives. We believe increasing the num-
ber of false positives is not an effective attack in real ap-
plications. For instance, in self-driving car applications,
not detecting pedestrians can be more harmful than de-
tecting many wrong pedestrians. Therefore, in designing
our blindness attack, we do not attempt to fool the object-
ness score, P (object) of YOLO and fool only the probabil-
ity of the object category conditioned on being an object,
P (category|object).
We initialize our patch to be a black patch (all zeros).
Then, we tune the noise z to reduce the probability of the
category c that we want to attack on all locations of the grid
that match the ground-truth. We do this by simply maximiz-
ing the summation of the cross-entropy loss of category c at
all those locations. For optimization, we adopt a method
similar to projected gradient descend (PGD) [17] in which
after each optimization step and updating z, we project z to
be in the range of the acceptable pixel values by clipping its
values. Note that z will have no contribution at the locations
off the patch where m = 0. We stop the optimization when
there is no detection for category c on the image or we reach
the maximum number of iterations.
Universal blindness attack: Following [19], we extend our
attack to learn universal adversarial patches. For category c,
we learn a universal patch z on training data that makes the
detector blind for category c across unseen test images. To
do so, we adopt the above optimization by iterating through
training images in the optimization while keeping z shared
across all images.
Significance of blindness attack: Note that there are two
ways of reducing mAP in object detection: (1) introducing
lots of false positives, (2) reducing true positives. We be-
lieve (1) can be achieved without exploiting the contextual
reasoning by generating lots of false positives at the patch
location to dominate the mAP calculation, which may not
necessarily affect the true positives. However, since we are
interested in showing the exploitation of contextual reason-
ing, we focus on (2) where the adversary should make the
detector blind by reducing true positives.
To see this effect, we modify the mAP calculation in our
experiments by removing any false positive at the patch lo-
cation. The prior work [16] considers regular mAP for eval-
uation which we believe does not necessarily show the con-
textual exploitation. This is shown on Fig. 10(a) of [16]
where lots of false positives are detected at the patch loca-
tion.
3.2. Defense for our adversarial attacks:
Defending against adversarial examples has been shown to
be challenging [4, 1]. As discussed in the introduction, we
believe defending against adversarial patches is even more
challenging since the attack is expensive and the perturba-
tion is not bounded to lie in the neighborhood of the original
image.
Grad-defense: Since we believe the main reason for our
successful attacks is the exploitation of contextual reason-
ing by the adversary, we design our defense algorithm to
limit the usage of contextual reasoning during training the
object detector.
In most fast (single shot) object detectors including
YOLO, each object location has a dedicated neuron in the
final layer of the network, and since the network is deep,
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those neurons have very large receptive fields that span the
whole image. To limit the usage of context by the detector,
we are interested in limiting this receptive field only to the
bounding box of the corresponding detection.
One way of doing this is to hard-code a smaller receptive
field by reducing the spatial size of the filters in the interme-
diate layers. However, this is not a great defense since: (1) it
will reduce the capacity and thus accuracy of the model, (2)
it shrinks the receptive field independent of the size of the
detected box, thereby hurting the detection of large objects.
We conducted an experiment where we change the network
architecture of YOLOv2 and set the filter sizes for all layers
after Layer16 (just before the pass-through connection) to
1x1. We observe that this model gives poor mAP on clean
images which is reported in Table 2.
We believe that a better way of limiting the receptive
field would be use a data-driven approach. Network inter-
pretation tools like Grad-CAM [25] that highlight the image
regions which influence a particular network decision can
be used. Grad-CAM works by visualizing the derivative
of the output with respect to an intermediate convolutional
layer (e.g., conv5 in AlexNet) that detects some high-level
concepts. We believe that to limit the contextual reasoning
in object detection, we should constrain such a visualiza-
tion for a particular output to not span beyond the bounding
box of the corresponding detected object. Hence, to de-
fend against adversarial attacks, during YOLOv2 training,
we calculate the derivative of each output with respect to an
intermediate convolutional layer and penalize its nonzero
values outside the detected bounding box.
More formally, assuming yc is the confidence of an ob-
ject belonging to category c detected at bounding box B
and Akij for the activation of a convolutional layer at loca-
tion (i, j) and channel k, we calculate the derivative ∂y
c
∂Akij
and normalize it to sum to 1 over the whole feature map:
βˆij =
βij∑
i,j βij
where βij =
∑
k
∣∣∣∣ ∂yc∂Akij
∣∣∣∣ (1)
Then, we minimize the following loss to encourage βˆ
values to be completely inside the bounding box B.
L = −
∑
i,j∈B
βˆij
Since βˆ sums to 1, minimizing this loss will minimize
the influence of image regions outside the detected bound-
ing box on its corresponding object detection. We believe
this is a regularizer that limits the receptive field of the fi-
nal layer depending on the size of detected objects. So, it
should limit the contextual reasoning of the object detector.
Interestingly, this loss can be even minimized on unlabeled
data in a semi-supervised setting.
Out-of-context(OOC) defense: Another way of limiting
contextual reasoning is to remove the influence of context
Figure 2: Out of context images- This figure shows exam-
ples from the out of context dataset we curated to train our
OOC defense model.
from the training data. We do so by simply overlaying an
out-of-context foreground object on the training images. To
create the dataset, we take two random images from the
PASCAL VOC training data, crop one of the annotated ob-
jects from the first image and paste it at the same location on
the second image. We blur the boundary of the pasted ob-
ject to remove sharp edges and also remove the annotations
of the second image corresponding to the objects occluded
by the added foreground object. We keep non-overlapping
annotations intact. We train YOLOv2 on the new dataset to
get a model that is less dependent on context. Fig. 2 shows
example out of context training images. We describe a few
other defense algorithms as baselines in the experiments.
4. Experiments
We use PASCAL VOC dataset [7] for all our experiments.
For each chosen attack category, we create a subset of im-
ages which contain the object category and where none of
the instances overlap with the patch area. This results in a
filtered image set per category. We also evaluate the univer-
sal blindness attack on KITTI dataset [9] for “pedestrian”
and “car”.
4.1. Implementation details:
We use Pytorch implementation of YOLOv2 and NVIDIA
Titan X GPUs to run our experiments. The image size is
fixed at 416 × 416 and our patch size is fixed at 100x100
which covers less than 6% of the image area. The top-left
corner of the patch is at pixel (5, 5). When optimizing, we
initialize z from all zeros (black patch) and use the Adam
optimizer. For per-image experiments, we use the learn-
ing rate of 0.1 and run the attack for 250 iterations per im-
age. For universal patch experiments, we use learning rate
of 0.01, minibatch size of 1, 10 iterations per minibatch,
and total of 100 epochs. The confidence threshold, NMS
threshold, and IOU overlap threshold used for evaluations
are 0.005, 0.45 and 0.5 respectively.
For Grad-defense experiments, we obtained best results
considering the gradients at 16th layer of YOLOv2 (just be-
fore the pass-through connection), and λ = 1.0 which bal-
ances the loss terms.
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Mean aero bike bird boat bottle bus car cat chair cow dtable dog horse mbike person pplant sheep sofa train tv
Total No. images - 205 250 289 176 240 183 775 332 545 127 247 433 279 233 2097 254 98 355 259 255
No. filtered images - 136 190 182 114 205 102 510 160 454 87 212 244 173 142 1286 174 73 273 148 187
YOLOv2 (clean) 76.04 75.05 81.02 75.22 66.58 50.59 81.08 79.86 80.96 64.40 85.19 76.32 85.35 85.91 80.08 75.62 57.28 79.90 79.83 83.30 77.18
White patch 76.33 75.30 80.59 76.01 67.00 50.69 81.20 79.85 80.89 64.18 84.83 76.99 85.93 86.33 80.23 75.69 57.75 79.86 81.02 84.82 77.42
Random noise patch 76.20 75.00 80.63 75.87 66.29 50.24 81.07 79.60 81.07 64.23 85.37 76.96 86.34 86.28 79.81 75.60 57.17 80.03 80.71 84.78 76.86
OOC attack 75.93 74.46 80.40 75.56 65.02 50.83 81.61 79.58 81.01 63.61 84.74 76.92 86.25 86.42 79.39 75.68 56.32 79.82 80.83 82.89 77.29
Adv patch attack (Ours) 55.42 40.89 71.51 44.11 38.46 39.90 60.25 62.28 57.25 54.33 54.03 71.27 62.90 67.98 66.77 59.87 38.48 55.53 64.14 47.96 50.56
Grad-Defense (clean) 75.83 73.41 80.71 75.33 61.32 47.28 81.33 81.05 84.19 63.11 86.02 77.01 86.14 85.91 82.84 74.39 53.34 81.01 81.12 84.73 76.40
Grad-Defense (attacked) 61.31 51.71 75.53 53.17 42.88 40.20 66.96 71.43 62.13 56.29 59.59 73.46 69.91 75.58 74.98 63.32 40.23 59.47 70.86 61.95 56.45
Table 1: Per-image blindness attacks, and defense evaluation- “YOLOv2 (clean)” shows the results of YOLOv2 on our
clean per-image attack test sets. AP is calculated only on the filtered subset of images. “Adv patch attack” is our adversarial
patch algorithm. We also evaluate three baseline attacks. Qualitative examples are shown in Fig. 4.
Mean aero bike bird boat bottle bus car cat chair cow dtable dog horse mbike person pplant sheep sofa train tv
Total No. training imgs - 68 95 91 57 102 51 255 80 227 43 106 122 86 71 643 87 36 136 74 93
Total No. testing imgs - 68 95 91 57 102 51 255 80 227 43 106 122 86 71 643 87 36 136 74 93
YOLOv2 (clean) 76.85 79.25 83.17 77.19 63.88 49.70 80.61 79.47 80.59 64.92 85.76 77.39 86.65 81.32 84.78 75.41 56.82 89.05 76.96 87.59 76.56
YOLOv2 (attacked) (Ours) 56.24 29.66 71.51 39.7 34.14 44.67 65.21 60.26 44.41 58.28 61.94 77.12 67.52 67.82 59.16 65.2 46.17 69.87 72.04 42.07 47.96
AT-2000 (clean) 64.01 53.17 69.84 58.82 41.98 39.34 67.42 71.15 70.74 50.27 69.97 71.35 77.09 77.06 75.72 69.16 44.89 76.06 63.26 62.05 70.95
AT-2000 (attacked) 41.55 17.36 55.57 27.36 17.55 36.41 31.67 47.02 39.34 42.76 38.98 71.93 64.01 38.12 51.38 57.16 28.82 42.55 59.88 22.70 40.43
AT-30 (clean) 70.47 73.81 75.60 65.49 54.73 43.28 76.81 75.87 71.15 57.14 81.41 74.04 72.66 77.81 79.42 68.89 47.10 85.65 74.79 78.93 74.80
AT-30 (attacked) 50.47 29.23 75.83 27.16 42.23 38.86 46.15 65.27 41.22 51.20 61.10 75.73 46.88 40.40 76.21 53.05 37.21 60.19 56.96 31.00 53.42
OOC Defense (clean) 65.67 79.93 75.63 59.53 48.54 34.68 78.39 74.23 71.35 44.51 68.22 76.31 69.73 72.50 68.18 66.02 38.90 74.34 64.55 76.84 70.93
OOC Defense (attacked) 60.35 70.81 70.03 45.84 44.47 33.06 76.87 70.98 60.26 36.89 67.55 76.01 64.47 71.40 61.63 64.26 37.42 68.68 63.72 63.98 58.75
YOLOv2 1x1 (clean) 59.55 69.34 68.79 51.15 41.41 43.48 61.86 73.98 51.71 48.28 72.96 55.08 66.58 65.96 70.29 66.01 41.00 77.89 43.04 54.52 67.59
YOLOv2 1x1 (attacked) 59.57 69.25 68.84 51.07 41.13 43.67 61.66 74.12 52.09 48.46 72.89 55.11 66.34 65.96 71.02 65.85 41.36 76.67 42.95 54.54 68.42
Gradient w.r.t. input (clean) 65.80 62.18 75.85 58.91 46.55 31.78 76.12 62.96 72.72 53.83 68.74 73.16 69.46 76.41 75.47 58.32 62.30 74.45 73.06 72.20 71.51
Gradient w.r.t. input (attacked) 48.97 22.39 67.68 29.68 22.02 29.30 67.70 45.03 39.96 49.19 42.80 74.71 61.23 55.89 65.10 46.45 41.66 51.78 69.53 42.39 54.82
Grad-Defense (clean) 76.09 76.31 83.08 75.49 65.15 46.41 83.11 80.53 81.99 63.73 87.22 77.63 86.4 81.26 84.57 74.12 51.69 83.88 78.26 85.95 74.94
Grad-Defense (attacked) 64.84 50.9 80.47 50.11 48.00 46.23 78.93 68.83 63.11 60.13 67.96 77.62 77.26 77.67 68.92 67.05 48.50 70.99 73.97 60.3 59.79
Table 2: Universal blindness attacks, and defense evaluation- “YOLOv2 (clean)” shows the results of YOLOv2 on our
clean universal attack test sets. Note that the image sets are different from Table 1. “YOLOv2 (attacked)” shows our universal
patch blindness attack. We report results for two adversarially trained models (2000 and 30 iterations). “OOC Defense” refers
to YOLOv2 trained on our out-of-context dataset. For YOLOv2 1x1, we limit the size of final conv layers to 1x1. “Gradient
w.r.t. input” penalizes the gradient of the output w.r.t the input in pixel space. “Grad-Defense” is our main defense algorithm
that outperforms other algorithms on both clean and attacked images. Qualitative examples are shown in Fig. 5.
4.2. Evaluation:
Since we are interested in learning adversarial patches that
do not overlap with the object, we fix the location of the
patch, e.g., at top-left corner, and run evaluations only for
images on which there is no object of interest overlapping
with the patch location as described earlier.
Because our filtered image sets are independent, we run
evaluations independently for each category and report the
AP scores for the category in question. Hence, the mean
average precision (mAP) we are reporting is a little different
from common practice since it is mean over categories that
use different image sets. This is due to the fact that there can
be multiple objects in an image and such images can be part
of different image sets. As mentioned earlier, we remove
the false positives overlapping with the patch because we
do not want our attack to work by making the patch as the
most salient object.
4.3. Results and discussion
In this section, we evaluate our attacks and defense algo-
rithms in various settings.
Per-image blindness attack: We consider three baselines
where we replace the adversarial patch with all white patch,
an i.i.d. noise patch, or an out-of-context patch and show
YOLOv2 YOLOv2
Detection Adv patch Detection
Ta
rg
et
:P
er
so
n
Person fooled
Ta
rg
et
:C
ar
Car fooled
Figure 3: Evaluation on KITTI dataset- Examples of trained
universal patch for car and person.
that our learned adversarial patch is better.
Table 1 shows the results of our per-image blindness at-
tack experiments. We show the total number of images in
PASCAL VOC 2007 and our filtered images. The “White
5
patch” and “Random i.i.d. noise” baselines do not affect
the accuracy which means the attack needs to be tuned.
Our attack reduces the mAP from 76.04% to 55.42% which
is 20.61 points reduction. The highest drop of almost 35
points is for “train” and “aeroplane”.
Universal blindness attack: Table 2 shows the results of
our universal blindness attack experiments. We divide the
filtered images to two halves for training and testing and
then learn a universal adversarial patch per category on the
training set and test it on the testing set. We see that our at-
tack reduces the mAP for YOLOv2 from 76.85% to 56.24%
which is almost 20.5 points reduction in mAP.
Defense evaluations: The results of defense algorithms are
reported in Table 2. Our Grad-defense algorithm outper-
forms other methods in terms of both accuracy on clean im-
ages (76.09%) and attacked images (64.84%). The original
YOLOv2 model has an accuracy of 76.85% on clean im-
ages and 56.24% on attacked images. This shows the effec-
tiveness of our defense method on limiting the contextual
reasoning. In Table 2, we also evaluate a few other defense
algorithms including training with out of context data. Our
Grad-defense is also effective for per-image attacks. The
results are reported in Table 1.
Adversarial training: Adversarial training is a common
defense method for regular adversarial examples. Unfortu-
nately, this is not suitable for adversarial patches since cal-
culating each adversarial patch example is computationally
expensive. For completeness, we use this as a baseline. We
use 30 and 2000 iterations to generate adversarial patch ex-
amples and use them in training the model. The results are
reported in Table 2. Even though we run the 2000 iteration
attack for almost 6 days, its accuracy on clean images was
still very low. The adversarially trained model has a clean
accuracy of 70.47% but it has poor performance after attack
and gives 50.47% accuracy.
Patch detection and Gaussian blurring: One might won-
der that because the adversarial patches are not norm-
constrained and look noisy, it should be easy to detect their
presence on the image using a simple network or blur them
using a Gaussian filter. In our experiments, we show that by
incorporating these techniques into our patch training loop,
we can still fool the patch detection or blurring system.
For the patch detection network, we create a dataset of
clean images and attacked images and finetune a ResNet-18
network for a binary classification task - whether a patch is
present in an image or not. We evaluate the performance
of the patch detector on our attacked images. Then, we in-
corporate the patch detector into our adversarial patch op-
timization loop by adding another loss which when mini-
mized fools the patch detector. We see that using the same
attack setting, we are able to achieve comparable attack ef-
ficiencies and are now able to fool the patch detector as
well. The results are shown in Table 3. We believe one
can still train another detector, so a more advanced defense
would be to train the attack and detector together in an ad-
versarial game setting. However, we believe it is beyond
the scope of this paper. For the Gaussian blurring case, we
create universal adversarial patches using our method and
add that to the image. The resultant image is blurred us-
ing a 7x7 Gaussian kernel to limit the effectiveness of the
patch. We observed that after blurring, we see an increase
of mAP from 56.24% to 71.53%. This means that the blur-
ring reduced the effectiveness of our patch. A similar idea
was discussed as a form of defense for `∞ adversarial ex-
amples in [14]. However, it was shown in [4] that such a
defense can be overcome by creating the adversary with the
knowledge of blurring. We perform a similar experiment
to show that adversarial patches can be created using the
knowledge of blurring filter. We include the Gaussian fil-
ter as an additional layer at the input and train our universal
patch iteratively by applying the blurring filter at randomly
selected iterations. After attack, this gives us an mAP of
53.25% which is comparable to the results that we had ob-
tained without incorporating blurring during training.
Per-image targeted attack: Though our main objective is
to show the presence of blindness attack, we also evaluate a
targeted attack. For each target object category, we choose
500 random images that do not contain the object. Then,
we “artificially” change all ground-truth object labels to the
target category in evaluation. We expect our targeted attack
to increase the mAP on this artificial ground-truth from zero
to a higher number. We use learning rate of 0.1 and run the
attack for 2,000 iterations per image. On evaluation after
attack, we see that the mAP increases from 0 to 18.61%.
The detailed results are reported in the appendix.
Per-image objectness attack: Because YOLO makes its
decision based on objectness as well as class scores, it is
interesting to see whether we can fool objectness. This can
be seen as a different form of attack. It is important to note
that all mAP evaluations are done keeping the objectness
threshold for acceptance at the original value of 0.005. To
perform objectness attack, we run the patch optimization
for 2,000 iterations per image and encourage the objectness
scores to be below 0.005. We use learning rate of 0.05 for
this experiment. We see a 17.5 point drop in mAP from
76.04% to 58.49%. The detailed results are provided in the
appendix.
Universal blindness attack for KITTI: We evaluate our
universal blindness attack on person (pedestrian) and car de-
tection on KITTI dataset which is closer to self-driving car
applications. Similar to PASCAL VOC experiments, we fil-
ter out the images for which the objects of interest overlap
with the patch, but since the patch is on the top-left corner
and people and cars are usually on the ground, we see that it
mostly never overlaps with the objects of interest. Then we
use the YOLOv2 model trained on PASCAL VOC dataset
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Mean aero bike bird boat bottle bus car cat chair cow dtable dog horse mbike person pplant sheep sofa train tv
YOLOv2 (attacked) 56.24 29.66 71.51 39.7 34.14 44.67 65.21 60.26 44.41 58.28 61.94 77.12 67.52 67.82 59.16 65.2 46.17 69.87 72.04 42.07 47.96
Patch detector accuracy 98.27 100.00 95.79 100.00 92.98 100.00 100.00 98.43 98.75 99.12 100.00 91.51 96.72 100.00 95.77 98.44 100.00 100.00 97.81 100.00 100.00
YOLOv2 (fool detector) 57.66 33.17 67.18 39.30 34.27 44.47 77.57 60.49 51.15 57.58 61.91 77.40 76.05 68.39 60.18 66.97 46.41 63.29 67.97 42.56 56.91
Patch detector accuracy 5.54 2.94 4.21 7.69 1.75 0.97 25.49 1.57 18.75 1.76 11.36 0.00 4.10 2.30 2.82 4.98 6.90 2.70 0.00 4.05 6.38
Table 3: Fooling patch detector- We show that even though a norm-unconstrained adversarial patch can be detected because
of its high frequency components, such a detector can be incorporated into the training loop and be fooled by our universal
blindness attack with similar efficiency.
YOLOv2 YOLOv2 Grad-Defense Grad-Defense
Detection Adv patch Detection Detection Adv patch Detection
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Bird fooled Bird detected
Figure 4: Per-image blindness attack and Grad-Defense results- We compare the detection results of YOLOv2 with our Grad-Defense
model . We attack each model separately. We see that our Grad-Defense model is less susceptible to context-based attack. The target
category is written below each example. The patch is always on the top-left corner.
and learn universal adversarial patches for person and car
categories. Since YOLOv2 needs to resize the image to be
square and KITTI frames have a different aspect ratio, we
crop a random square box from the middle of KITTI frames
so that we do not degrade the image quality by stretching it.
Qualitative results are shown in Fig. 3. Our attack reduces
car detection AP from 59.0% to 31.8% and person detection
from 51.7% to 34.2% which are significant reductions.
DetGrad-CAM for visualization of context: To analyze
the usage of contextual information in object detection, we
may use interpretation algorithms similar to those in object
classification literature [25, 27, 34]. We consider a popular
algorithm, Grad-CAM [25] which is for classification tasks.
Specifically, we want to highlight the regions in the image
responsible for the detection of each object. We can then
analyze the amount of contextual information used by the
model. To summarize the Grad-CAM algorithm, we use no-
tations defined for Equation 1. The algorithm measures the
importance score of each intermediate feature on the confi-
dence yc of an object by calculating:
αck =
1
Z
∑
i,j
∂yc
∂Akij
(2)
where Z is a normalizer. Then we calculate the weighted
summation of activations and consider only the positive val-
ues, i.e, Gcij = max(0,
∑
k α
c
kA
k
ij). The final heatmap G
c
ij
is resized to be in the size of input image.
However, the summation in Equation 2 has the effect
of removing the spatial information when calculating the
importance score. If an image has multiple objects of the
same category, this can lead to highlighting all object in-
stances for each detected instance. Since object detectors
are trained to classify as well as localize the objects, the
gradient values of the interpretation algorithm contain in-
formation regarding the location of the object. As a result,
summation over all locations would result in loss of the spa-
tial information. Hence, we modify the algorithm for detec-
tion task, namely DetGrad-CAM, by doing element-wise
multiplication of gradients with the activations, and then
summing over all features, i.e we calculate the heatmap as
follows:
G˜cij = max(0,
∑
k
∂yc
∂Akij
Akij) (3)
We believe this simple modified method results in better
explanation for object detection models as shown in Fig.
6. We also see that the Grad-defense model is using lesser
contextual information compared to original model which
leads to better defense against context-based adversaries.
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YOLOv2 YOLOv2 Grad-Defense Grad-Defense
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Figure 5: Universal patch blindness attack and Grad-Defense results- For every pair of images, the left one is the original image with
detection and right one is the attacked image. The patch is always on the top-left corner. The objective is to make the network blind to the
target category.
YOLOv2 YOLOv2 YOLOv2 Grad-defense Grad-defense Grad-defense
Detection Grad-CAM [25] DetGrad-CAM Detection Grad-CAM [25] DetGrad-CAM
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Figure 6: DetGrad-CAM- We observe that modifying Grad-CAM gives us better visual interpretations for the object detector. For each
image we show the interpretation results of a detected object using Grad-CAM[25] and DetGrad-CAM from YOLOv2 and also our Grad-
defense model. The category for which interpretation is calculated is written on the left. Note that for the first row, we are interested in
finding the interpretation for the right-most instance and interestingly Grad-CAM highlights all three instances as important for detection.
5. Conclusion
Single shot object detectors, like Faster-RCNN, SSD, and
YOLO, have become popular due to their fast inference
time. They run the model on the image only once rather
than running a model on every proposal bounding box e.g.,
in RCNN. Hence, such models naturally learn to employ
contextual reasoning which results in better accuracy. In
this paper we show that such reliance on context makes the
detector vulnerable to our adversarial patch attacks in which
the adversary can make the detector blind for a category
chosen by the attacker without even occluding those objects
in the scene. This is also a practical attack that can cause
serious issues when deep models are deployed in real world
applications like self-driving cars. Moreover, we propose a
defense algorithm by regularizing the model to limit the in-
fluence of image regions outside the bounding boxes of the
detected objects. We show that the model trained this way
is improves robustness to the proposed attack. However, we
believe there is a need for developing better defense algo-
rithms for adversarial patch attacks.
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Appendix
We show more results in the appendix. Please refer to the captions of tables and figures for the description.
Figure A1: Sensitivity to patch size - We study the effect of the variation of patch size on our blindness attacks. We observe
that as the patch size decreases, the attack success rate decreases. These results are also shown in Table A1.
Mean aero bike bird boat bottle bus car cat chair cow dtable dog horse mbike person pplant sheep sofa train tv
Per-image
YOLOv2 (clean) 76.04 75.05 81.02 75.22 66.58 50.59 81.08 79.86 80.96 64.40 85.19 76.32 85.35 85.91 80.08 75.62 57.28 79.90 79.83 83.30 77.18
YOLOv2 (50x50 patch) 73.77 72.20 80.36 72.95 61.18 48.99 80.55 78.55 80.73 62.94 77.78 75.67 84.34 81.09 78.81 74.54 53.19 77.12 79.03 82.03 73.27
YOLOv2 (75x75 patch) 66.79 61.30 76.79 62.69 48.42 46.31 72.39 72.68 69.90 59.59 65.88 75.06 77.06 80.35 76.81 70.35 44.55 68.11 75.88 69.68 61.97
YOLOv2 (100x100 patch) 55.42 40.89 71.51 44.11 38.46 39.90 60.25 62.28 57.25 54.33 54.03 71.27 62.90 67.98 66.77 59.87 38.48 55.53 64.14 47.96 50.56
Universal
YOLOv2 (clean) 76.85 79.25 83.17 77.19 63.88 49.70 80.61 79.47 80.59 64.92 85.76 77.39 86.65 81.32 84.78 75.41 56.82 89.05 76.96 87.59 76.56
YOLOv2 (50x50 patch) 76.47 78.86 82.35 77.39 62.01 49.96 80.71 78.48 80.51 64.72 84.12 78.18 86.83 80.77 84.68 75.73 56.93 86.43 75.86 87.49 77.47
YOLOv2 (75x75 patch) 72.25 66.48 82.88 73.85 59.93 45.79 80.42 77.08 68.55 62.07 74.12 77.62 78.63 80.94 77.02 75.09 53.09 80.64 75.09 85.04 70.57
YOLOv2 (100x100 patch) 56.24 29.66 71.51 39.7 34.14 44.67 65.21 60.26 44.41 58.28 61.94 77.12 67.52 67.82 59.16 65.2 46.17 69.87 72.04 42.07 47.96
Table A1: Sensitivity to patch size - The first 4 rows are the per-image blindness attack and the last 4 rows are the universal
blindness attack.
Mean aero bike bird boat bottle bus car cat chair cow dtable dog horse mbike person pplant sheep sofa train tv
YOLOv2 (clean) 76.04 75.05 81.02 75.22 66.58 50.59 81.08 79.86 80.96 64.40 85.19 76.32 85.35 85.91 80.08 75.62 57.28 79.90 79.83 83.30 77.18
YOLOv2 (attacked) 58.49 38.60 73.86 49.39 34.27 41.12 60.50 61.50 71.91 53.38 56.74 73.24 71.94 75.01 70.69 58.30 38.48 58.99 70.61 58.23 52.98
Table A2: Per-image objectness attack - This attack is described in Per-image objectness attack paragraph of Section 4.3
in the main paper and the qualitative results are in Figure A4 of appendix. We perform a different kind of adversarial patch
attack by trying to fool YOLOv2 objectness confidence.
Mean aero bike bird boat bottle bus car cat chair cow dtable dog horse mbike person pplant sheep sofa train tv
Clean 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Targeted attack 18.61 13.09 13.55 22.30 15.48 11.99 16.36 20.06 20.47 19.50 21.05 19.86 21.65 20.96 15.23 28.64 15.28 19.40 23.54 16.03 17.73
Table A3: Per-image targeted attack on artificial ground-truth - This attack is described in Per-image targeted attack
paragraph of Section 4.3 in the main paper and the qualitative results are in Figure A5 of appendix. Our mAP before attack is
approximately zero for all targets because we switch the ground truth labels during evaluation. We see an average increase in
mAP of around 18 points. This means our adversarial patch successfully switches the detections of quite a few ground truth
boxes to the target class. Note that this attack is more challenging than the blindness attack.
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Figure A2: Per-image blindness attack fooling results - Additional results showcasing the fooling in Per-image blindness
attack described in Section 3.1. These are similar to the fooling results in Figure 4 of the main paper. For every pair of
columns, the left one is the original image and the right one is the attacked image. The attacked category is written below
each example. A failure case is the right image of Row 1, where three out of seven instances of “cars” are detected correctly
after attack.
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Figure A3: Universal patch blindness attack - Additional results showcasing Universal patch blindness attack described
in Section 3.1 .These are similar to the fooling results in Figure 5 of main paper. For every pair of columns, the left one is
the original image and the right one is the attacked image. The patch is always on the top-left corner. The attacked category
is written below each example.
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Figure A4: Objectness attack - This attack is described in Per-image objectness attack paragraph of Section 4.3 in the
main paper and the quantitative results are in Table A2 of appendix. For every pair of columns, the left one is the original
image and the right one is the attacked image. Note that this attack is class agnostic.
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Figure A5: Per-image targeted attack - This attack is described in Per-image targeted attack paragraph of Section 4.3 in
the main paper and the quantitative results are in Table A3 of appendix. We attack the model to change the label of all objects
to the target category. For every pair of columns, the left one is the original image and the right one is the attacked image.
The target category is written below each example. As failure cases, a “horse” instance on the left image of Row 4 and a
“chair” instance on the right image of Row 2 are still detected correctly.
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